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and a previous one,29 has added a third exception, namely, that if the
court feels an operating receivership will enure to the benefit of the
secured creditors by making the liquidation of the assets more suc-
cessful, either by selling them in the usual course of business rather
than by a forced sale or by caring for them pending the sale, then
the court is justified in granting a receivership with the expenses being
first paid out of the fund realized by the sale, although the secured
creditor did not consent thereto.
Where the majority rule is ignored, as in the Armour case, general
creditors of a private corporation are allowed to try the experiment of a
receivership with authority to operate the business in the hope that the
business can be made to pay under the receivership, although it failed
to do so under its officers. This is done at the expense of the non-
consenting secured creditors if the experiment is a failure.
CLAUD WHEATLY, JR.
Taxation-Alimony Trusts-Power of Divorce Court to
Modify as Determining Settlor's Taxability.
In the recent case of Helvering v. Fuller,1 a wife obtained a Nevada
divorce, the decree incorporating and approving a pre-divorce agree-
ment. The agreement provided for an irrevocable trust, created by the
husband, income from which was payable to the wife for ten years for
her support and maintenance, when the corpus was to become hers abso-
lutely; for other property settlements; and for waiver by each of all
claims against the other. Held: Trust income was not taxable to the
husband.
In the companion case of Helvering v. Leonard,2 a wife obtained a
New York divorce, the decree incorporating and approving a pre-divorce
agreement. The agreement provided for the creation by the husband
of an irrevocable trust comprised partly of bonds the principal and
interest of which he guaranteed. The trust income 3 was payable to the
wife for life for her support and maintenance, corpus to be held for
their children on her death. Held: The trust income was taxable to the
husband.
Why this disparity in tax liability growing out of facts essentially
similar, differing only in minor -detail? The opinion in the Leonard
case relies on two distinguishing characteristics which determine the
issue: 1st-Taxpayer Leonard guaranteed the principal and interest on
"' Bank of Pinehurst v. Mid-Pines Country Club, Inc., 208 N. C. 239, 179
S. E. 882 (1935).
1 310 U. S. 69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784, 84 L. ed. 715 (1940).
-310 U. S. 80, 60 Sup. Ct. 780, 84 L. ed. 721 (1940).




the trusteed bonds; 2nd-he was a party to a divorce obtained in New
York. Obviously the former, subject to the acquiescence of the wife,
was at the outset within his control; and had he chosen to be less gen-
erous, that decisive element would have been eliminated. The latter sug-
gests, at least, the advisability of a more discreet choice of jurisdiction.
There is no attempt here to extol the virtues of a tax policy which
in all cases so outlines its requisites as to leave the incidence to the
free discretion of the taxpayer, nor to determine the justice or advis-
ability of taxing one rather than the other party to similar transactions.
However, there is a provocative implication, worthy of pursuit, in the
dissent of Mr. Justice Reed that "Fine distinctions are necessary in rea-
soning but most undesirable in a national tax system."1
4
The controversy centers around the application of the doctrine of
Douglas v. Wilcuts5 to these fact situations. That principle,6 arising
wholly without the express aid of statute,7 has represented an effort by
the Court to supplement the work of Congress in reducing the effec-
tiveness of the trust as an instrument of tax avoidance. Briefly stated,
it taxes the settlor on the income of any trust, not otherwise so taxable,
which is applied to discharge his legal obligations. Underlying is the
doctrine of "constructive receipt" 8-that having received the benefit of
the income, settlor may not now escape its attendant liabilities merely
because it was directed through the medium of a trust to the payment
of an otherwise non-deductible expense. Hence, the primary requisite
is a "continuing obligation", running from settlor to beneficiary, to
which the income is devoted. In the Douglas case, such an obligation
was found in the general duty of husband to' support wife, made spe-
cific by a divorce decree and continuing thereafter. Amounts paid in
discharge of that duty are not deemed income to the wife,9 and a hus-
'Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784, 789, 84 L. ed. 715, 720
(1940).
r296 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59, 80 L. ed. 3 (1935).
'See generally MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1939 Cum.
Supp.) §34.168; Bloomenthal, Incoime Tax Aspects of Alimnony Trusts (1939)
17 TAx MAG. 455; Paul, Five Years With Douglas v. Willcuts (1939) 53 HARv.
L. REv. 1; Tye, Federal Taxation of Irrevocable Trusts Re xamibed (April 1940)
18 TAX MAG. 216, 220; Notes (1937) 23 CORN. L. Q. 178, (1939) 52 HAsv. L.
REv. 804, (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 337.
7 Income not received by settlor is expressly taxed to him only under §§166,
167 of the Federal Revenue Act. 52 Stat. 519 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §166 (1940) ;
52 Stat. 519 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §167 (1940). The Court has construed the "gross
income!' provision, 52 Stat. 457 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §22a (1940) as well as 52
Stat. 464 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §24 (1940), relating to non-deductible items, as
covering the maintenance trust situation.
' See Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 675, 679, 53 Sup. Ct. 761, 763, 764, 77
L. ed. 1439, 1442, 1444 (1933) : Paul, supra note 6, at 6, n. 17.
'Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 8, 56 Sup. Ct. 59, 62, 80 L. ed. 3, 8 (1935)
citing Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 577, 21 Sup. Ct. 735, 736, 45 L. ed.
1009, 1010 (1901) and Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153, 38 Sup. Ct. 53, 62
L. ed. 211, 213 (1917).
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band may receive no deduction for them.10 There the decree of divorce
incorporated the terms of a trust agreement under which the wife would
receive a stipulated annual income "in lieu of, and in full settlement of
alimony, and of any and all dower rights or statutory interests in the es-
tate of" her husband, and "in lieu of any and all claims for separate
maintenance and allowance for her support." Holding the husband tax-
able on this income, the Court points out that "the income of the trust
fund. . . stands substantially on the same footing as though he had re-
ceived the income personally and had been required by the decree to make
the payments directly."' Further, "upon the pre-existing duty of the
husband the decree placed a particular and adequate sanction, and im-
posed upon the petitioner the obligation to devote the income in ques-
tion, through the medium of the trust, to the use of his divorced wife.
' 12
The Court dwelled at length on the legal status of such a decree in
Minnesota, pointing out, although not elaborating upon, the power of
the court later to modify the award. That the husband had agreed to
make up deficiencies in the trust income and the property was to revert
to him free of the trust on his wife's death received no consideration in
the opinion.
Subsequently, in Helvering v. Fitch,'3 the Supreme Court disclosed
the importance of the elements undiscussed in the Douglas case, indi-
cating definite limitations to the once broad doctrine.14 Here the trust,
providing for the separate maintenance of the wife, comprised certain
property, the rent from which was to be paid to her each month during
her life. The corpus was irrevocably alienated by a provision that it
should go to the children on the death of wife and settlor; and no por-
tion of the monthly payments was guaranteed. The divorce decree
confirmed the property and alimony settlement. The Court points out
two factors, absent here, which they feel influenced the result of the
Douglas case: (1) Douglas agreed to make up any deficiencies in the
income; (2) the corpus was to revest in him on the death of his wife.
These, it is said, made it evident that the "alimony trust, which was
approved by the decree, was merely security for a continuing obligation
of the taxpayer to support his divorced wife."15 A third factor which
they feel conclusively determined the status of the Douglas trust was
the power of the Minnesota court subsequently to alter and revise its
10 52 Stat. 464 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §24a (1940).
"1Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 9, 56 Sup. Ct. 59, 63, 80 L. ed. 3, 9 (1935).1 Id. at 8, 56 Sup. Ct. at 62, 80 L. ed. at 8.
309 U. S. 149, 60 Sup. Ct. 427, 84 L. ed. 399 (1940).
14 See Bloomenthal, supra note 6, at 457 where it is indicated that the Board
of Tax Appeals has in the past disclosed a tendency to follow the first broad
implications of the doctrine.




decree and the provisions therein for the wife's benefit. After ,survey-
ing the law of Iowa, state of the Fitch divorce, they find the husband
taxable, since he has at least not sustained the burden of proving that
no such power exists in the divorce courts of that state.
"If we were to conclude that this case is an exception to that rule
(Douglas v. Willcuts) we would be acting largely on conjecture as to
Iowa law. That we cannot do. For if such a result is to obtain it must
be bottomed on clear and convincing proof, and not on mere inferences
and vague conjectures, that local law and the alimony trust have given
the divorced husband a full discharge and leave no continuing obliga-
tion howevier contingent.16 Only in that event can income to the wife
from an alimony trust be treated under the revenue acts the same as
income accruing from property after a debtor has transferred that
property to his creditor in full satisfaction of his obligation-unless of
course Congress decides otherwise."' 7
Thus, the principle seems to have these limits: 1-The pre-existing
obligation may be terminated; and if it is, the settlor will not be taxable
since there is no longer an obligation to which the trust income is
devoted. Consequently, where this result obtains, the nature of the
trust is altered, and the income therefrom becomes analogous to that
accruing from property which has been transferred from debtor to cred-
itor in full payment of a debt-which, as the Court implies, would
certainly not be taxable to the debtor.' 8 2-But whether the obligation
is so terminated depends upon (a) stipulations in the trust agreement
itself, such as a covenant to make up deficiencies, which leave an obli-
gation continuing after the divorce; or (b) provisions in the state
law, such as the power to modify the tlecree, which have a like effect.
If these factors, or either of them, exist the trust becomes "merely
security for a continuing obligation" to support.
Carried to its logical extreme, and supported by the actual result
of the Fitch case, the ultimate criterion of taxability thus becomes the
power of the divorce court to modify its decree. More than that, the
issue may finally turn upon the ability of the settlor to convince the
Court that no such power exists, for as said in the Leonard case, "all
' Italics supplied.
1? Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149, -, 60 Sup. Ct. 427, -, 84 L. ed. 399,
403 (1940).18 Although there bas been no express holding, dictum in the Fitch case (see
note 15, supra) indicates that a husband's reversionary interest in the corpus
might prevent the trust from assuming this character. This factor alone might
determine his taxability, since the trust would then seem more nearly a "channel
for the application" of his income than an outright transfer of property. It may
be significant that in the Fuller case, the only one of this series in which the
husband escaped tax, the corpus was to be transferred outright to the wife after
ten years. The effect of remainders over to others than the husband or wife,
such as to their children who would otherwise be the object of his bounty, remains
to be disclosed by future cases where that point alone is present.
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we do hold is that respondent has not shown by 'clear and convincing
proof' that the court lacks the power. . . ."19 Thus, two trusts, 20 iden-
tical in every detail, incorporated in decrees granting divorces based
on the same facts, but decided in different states, may have opposite
tax results merely because of fortuitous distinctions in local law.
Recently in Lyeth v. Hoey,2 1 the Court reiterated the rule under
which it adverts to state law in construing the Federal Revenue Act :22
"In dealing with the meaning and application of an act of Congress
enacted in the exercise of its plenary power under the Constitution to
tax income and to grant exemptions from that tax, it is the will of
Congress which controls, and the expression of its will, in the absence
of language evidencing a different purpose, should be interpreted so
as to give a uniform application to a nation-wide scheme of taxation....
Congress establishes its own criteria and the state law may control only
when the federal taxing act by express language or necessary implica-
tion makes its operation dependent upon state law."
'23
Obviously, where the statute is expressly dependent upon state law,
the Court is powerless to avoid any inequities which may result from
local legal divergencies. However, when the statute is silent and the
question becomes one of legislative intent, the Court is in a favorable
position to effect "a uniform application" of the tax. Thus, where a
particular economic result or benefit is the criterion for the tax, state
law may be applied to establish its existence; but where the result or
benefit exists independently of its characterization in local law, that
law may be disregarded.24 For example, whether title to certain prop-
erty has passed is, for most purposes, a matter of state law ;25 whether
it has passed by "inheritance" or otherwise is exclusively a federal
question. 26 However, an anomalous situation has arisen where, in con-
struing the "gross income" provision, the Court has given effect to the
characterization of income by the community property states, which is
unlike that obtaining elsewhere.27 As many authorities contend, the
"' Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U. S. 80, -, 60 Sup. Ct. 780, 784, 84 L. ed.
721, 724 (1940).
2 Compare 1-elvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784, 84 L. ed. 715
(1940) with Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149, 60 Sup. Ct. 427, 84 L. ed. 399
(1940).
21305 U. S. 188, 59 Sup. Ct. 155, 83 L. ed. 119 (1938).
2 See generally, PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (2nd Ser.
1938) 1-52; 5 PAUL & MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL IlNcoE TAXATION (1934)
§53.38; Note (1934) 34 CoL. L. Rzv. 526.
2 Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188, 194, 59 Sup. Ct. 155, 158, 83 L. ed. 119, 124
(1938).
2' Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110, 46 Sup. Ct. 48, 70
L. ed. 183 (1925); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103, 53 Sup. Ct. 74, 77 L. ed.
199 (1932).
22 See 5 PAUL & MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 22, at 863.
2Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188. 59 Sup. Ct. 155, 83 L. ed. 119 (1938).
27 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 51 Sup. Ct. 58, 75 L. ed. 239 (1930) (hold-
ing each spouse taxable on only one-half of community income, since under state
[Vol. 19
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consequence has been gross inequality in tax results although the eco-
nomic benefits are identical. 28 For the most part, however, the court
has achieved singular success in this endeavor to distribute the tax
burden equally. Since this expedient is an outgrowth of that judicial
and legislative approach to tax questions which seeks substance rather
than form of taxable transactions, 29 no definite rules may be evolved as
a guide to future cases. The course followed in each case must neces-
sarily vary with the nature of the tax, the subject, and the policy to be
effectuated. That the Court should be left free to effectuate a clear
policy of Congress is not to be questioned; but where the procedure
adapted to that end involves inequities plainly unforeseeable by Con-
gress, the Court should await its more detailed articulation.
In taxing the income from alimony trusts, the statute by whose
implication the Court has justified its advertence to state law merely
says that no deduction shall be allowed for "family expenses" in com-
puting net income.30 That this statute covers the present situation is
clear when it is recalled that payment of such an expense by the income
from an irrevocable trust is, in effect, an attempt by a circuitous route
to receive a prohibited deduction. Thus, by indirection, the Court has
reasoned that payments to a divorced wife are in discharge of a "family
expense" where the obligation to support continues-the continuance of
that obligation depending ultimately upon the power of the divorce
court to modify its decree. Therefore, state law is applied to determine
if that power exists.
A general survey will disclose that the conditions under which this
power may be exercised vary considerably from state to state and often
in a manner wholly unrelated to basic rights or liabilities of the hus-
band.3 ' But accepting the basic premise of the Court that the power to
modify will render the obligation to support continuing and the trust a
mere security for that obligation, a recourse to state law is inescapable
since the condition upon which the tax attaches may only be found
there. However, such recourse may at the same time result in a lack
of uniformity in the incidence of the tax if the power to modify has
merely a theoretical rather than a substantial effect on the present rela-
tion of the divorced couple.
Whether this effect upon the nature of the "post-marital" relation
law wife technically had a "vested" interest as distinguished from an "expectancy"
in the income.) MAGI L, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 268-274."8 See PAUL, op. cit. smpra note 22, at 40-44; Altman, Community Property:
Avoiding Avoidance by Adoption in the Revenue Act (1938) 16 TAx MAG. 138.
2 See Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 677, 53 Sup. Ct 761, 763, 77 L. ed.
1439, 1443, (1933).
" 52 Stat. 464 (1938), 26 U. S. C. §24a (1940).
.'See Note (1937) 109 A. L. R. 1068; also see Note (1940) 40 COL. L. REv.
677, 679, n. 17.
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is substantive or merely formal is a question of the most abstruse logic.
However that may be, the economic relation of husband to wife is iden-
tical except in one respect; i.e. where the power exists, the husband
may be later called upon to add to the settlement previously approved.
As a practical matter, what substantial obligation is being discharged
by his trust income which is not also being discharged by that of the
husband more fortunately residenced? What benefits accruing to the
former are denied the latter? Far from being continuing, the obligation
to further contribute has yet to arise. Yet, the Court would answer,
"the existence of wholly contingent obligations-is adequate to support
the results reached in Douglas v. Willcuts .... ,,"2 To the practical
mind this might suggest that the contingent obligation is being dis-
charged by trust income; therefore, settlor is taxable. Obviously this
is not true in the sense that the specific obligation has arisen. Then
does it mean that the contingent obligation is subject to being dis-
charged by trust income once the contingency has occurred? Not only
would such reasoning seem to remove the case from the basic rule since
in fact the obligation is not now being so discharged, but it also seems,
at b~st, a half-truth since, when the obligation does arise (unless there
is a re-allocation of trust income), it might be discharged in ways
wholly unrelated to the trust originally set up. Clearly, the meaning is
simply that since there is a possibility of the husband's having to con-
tribute further, the decree does not make his general duty to support
sufficiently definitive to be subject to absolute discharge in the same
manner that a liquidated debt is satisfied by a lump sum settlement;
thus, the duty to support continues. Certainly there may be contingent
liabilities remaining, such as those arising from the trust agreement
itself, which lend more definite reality to this position. But granted that
where the power to modify exists, the husband is not completely dis-
charged, the possibility of its exercise seems of too little consequence
in most cases to justify its being designated as the dividing line between
taxability and non-taxability. If the power were never exercised,
clearly the actual nature of the post-marital relation would have been
the same as if no such power had ever existed, whatever its abstract
nature might have been. The logic of the Court seems to depend upon
a distinction without a substantial difference, and results in a disparity
of treatment not justified by a difference in practical enjoyment or
benefit.
The Court might well have viewed the power to modify, not as
assuming the continuance of an obligation to support, but rather as
referable to a public policy which authorizes adjustments of post-marital




financial arrangements as exigencies arise. If, in that event, the trust
approved by the decree appeared to be in final satisfaction of the obliga-
tion made specific by that judgment itself, the continuity of the general
duty to support would be broken; and the obligation would exist only
as and when declared in a modifying judgment. Should the new decree
place burdens upon the husband which are discharged in a manner
unconnected with the original trust, it is clear that the trust payments
should not have been taxed to him. Thus, not the mere potentiality of
its exercise, but the exercise of the power itself in the form of a modify-
ing judgment, which prescribed new obligations and the manner of
their discharge, would be looked to in determining taxability. Not only
does this view seem to conform more closely to the realities of the sit-
uation; but also its adoption would eliminate the inequities which arise
from the use of a criterion found in local law, the effect whose exist-
ence or non-existence is more often theoretical than real.
Although the uniformity of tax incidence guaranteed by the Consti-
tution is "geographic" rather than "intrinsic", 3 and a statute conform-
ing to the present view of the Court would no doubt be sustained on
this ground, it is highly desirable from the point of view of both the
Government and the taxpayer to avoid any inequalities not justified by
considerations peculiar to the particular tax.34 No such considerations
are apparent here. The uncertainties inherent in the present holdings
suggest the need of a statute expressly designed to cover the main-
tenance trust situation. Meanwhile, rather than to adopt a policy which
often permits discrimination, the Court might well have sanctioned a
tax upon the settlor in all such cases, an approach which the dissent
asserts is most consistent with the choice first made in Douglas v. Will-
cuts.35 But whether a statute is forthcoming, it should be strongly em-
phasized that insistence upon highly doctrinary theory will not always
assure that reality of treatment which the Court itself has so often
encouraged and tax administration demands.
E. H. SEAWELL.
Torts-Municipal Corporations-Liability foT Death or
Injury to Prisoner.
Two recent North Carolina cases1 involve injuries committed by
one prisoner on a fellow-prisoner. It is significant to note that on
" Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. ed. 969 (1900);
Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 47 Sup. Ct. 265, 71 L. ed. 511 (1927).
" See PAUL, op. cit. supra note 22, at 49-52.
"See Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69, -, 60 Sup. Ct. 784, 789, 84 L. ed.
715, 720 (1940).
'Dunn v. Swanson, 217 N. C. 279, 7 S. E. (2d) 563 (1940) ; Parks v. Prince-
ton, 217 N. C. 361, 8 S. E. (2d) 217 (1940).
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